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OPINION∗ 
______________ 
 
GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
At the heart of this case is a contract dispute between two natural gas companies, 
Plaintiff-Appellant Orion Drilling Company, LLC (“Orion”) and Defendant-Appellee 
Equitable Production Company (“EQT”).  In short, due to safety concerns, EQT 
terminated two rig drilling contracts it had with Orion.  As a result, EQT and Orion now 
dispute whether liquidated damages are or are not due to Orion.  Orion believes that 
Exhibit A, section 7.3, found in both drilling contracts, sets forth the only method by 
which EQT could terminate the drilling contracts early without paying liquidated 
damages.  EQT disagrees, claiming that per section 6.5, found in both drilling contracts, 
it is entitled to terminate early due to Orion’s default and material breach.  For example, 
EQT argues that Orion’s failure to comply with industry standards or to meet safety 
polices relieves it of any obligation to make liquidated damages payments.  Orion sued 
EQT for breach of contract, a jury found in favor of EQT, and the District Court upheld 
 
 ∗ This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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that verdict.  There are six issues on appeal, and for the reasons discussed below, we will 
affirm in toto.    
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
A. Factual Background1 
1. The Contracts   
In 2014, Orion and EQT entered into four contracts regarding Orion’s building 
and operation of two drilling rigs—Rig 17 and Rig 18—for EQT: a drilling contract for 
each rig and a construction contract for each rig.  The Rig 17 and Rig 18 drilling 
contracts (collectively the “Drilling Contracts”), which are governed by Pennsylvania 
law, are of primary relevance to this dispute.2  The Drilling Contracts each contain the 
essential provisions that control this dispute—section 6.5 and Exhibit A, section 7.3.3   
 
1 We note at the outset that the District Court’s September 10, 2019 Opinion was 
very thorough, assiduously detailing the facts of this case, and we reference the opinion 
throughout.  See Orion Drilling Co. v. EQT Prod. Co., No. CV 16-1516, 2019 WL 
4273861, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 10, 2019).  
  
2 Per the Drilling Contracts, using the rigs it would build and own, Orion would 
drill wells for EQT in exchange for specified payments per day.  Also, per the Drilling 
Contracts, Orion had the sole obligation to ensure the safe operation of the rigs.   
 
3 Two other provisions with ancillary relevance are section 6.1 and section 6.4.  
Section 6.1 details the duration of each contract (i.e., the respective terms for each rig), 
while section 6.4, which was amended, pertains to the “Early Termination 
Compensation” and directs one to “See ‘Exhibit A, Other Provisions’ Item 7.3.”  
JA346, 381 (emphasis in the original); see also Orion Drilling, 2019 WL 4273861, at 
*2–4 (showing the stricken former section 6.4, located above section 6.5, which had 
described early termination compensation and provided for liquidated damages but now 
directs one to Exhibit A, section 7.3).  
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Section 6.5 pertains to “TERMINATION” and has two subsections regarding: (1) 
“Project Termination for Default,” and (2) the rights EQT has “[i]n the event of a 
default by [Orion][.]”  JA346, 381 (emphasis in the original); see also Orion Drilling, 
2019 WL 4273861, at *3–4 (reproducing, for ease of reference, the Drilling Contracts’ 
relevant provisions).  Exhibit A, section 7.3 pertains to “Early Termination” and details 
how EQT can terminate the drilling contract early, for any reason, so long as liquidated 
damages are paid, unless three conditions are met.4  JA355, 390; see also Orion Drilling, 
2019 WL 4273861, at *4–5.    
2. Rig Failures and EQT’s Early Termination  
In 2015, both Rig 17 and Rig 18 began drilling.  Subsequently, there were four key 
dropped block incidents on Rig 18.5  Three dropped blocks occurred on September 25, 
 
4 These three conditions permit EQT to terminate early per Exhibit A, section 7.3 
without “pay[ing] an early termination amount” if any one of the conditions can be 
satisfied, for example, the second condition is if: “(b) [Orion] suffers involuntary or 
voluntary bankruptcy, is insolvent or subject to receivership or similar insolvency 
proceedings.”  JA355, 390; see also Orion Drilling, 2019 WL 4273861, at *4. 
 
5 “A dropped block is an uncontrolled descent of approximately 50,000 pounds of 
the drill’s top drive, traveling block, and associated equipment in the mast[.]”  Orion 
Drilling, 2019 WL 4273861, at *5 (citation and quotation marks omitted); see also id. at 
*5–6 (referencing evidence from trial detailing not only the “peril” of such incidents, 
which “raise significant safety concerns for the lives and well-being of any contractors or 
employees working on the drilling platform below,” but also the “rarity” of even a single 
incident).   
In addition to the dropped block incidents, there were also other safety concerns 
regarding both rigs—documented by EQT via letters to Orion—that EQT believed were 
“directly related to the [Integrated Drive Systems (“IDS”)] or [were] premature 
equipment failures of critical components necessary to efficiently and safely execute [the] 
drilling program.”  JA3355; see also Orion Drilling, 2019 WL 4273861, at *6 (noting 
that each rig was equipped with the IDS control system); Appellee Br. 7 (explaining that 
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2015 (“Incident One”), October 10, 2015 (“Incident Two”), and June 7, 2016 (“Incident 
Three”).  The fourth key dropped block occurred after EQT terminated the Drilling 
Contracts.   
After each incident, there was correspondence between the two companies.  See 
generally Orion Drilling, 2019 WL 4273861, at *6–9 (providing a more detailed recount 
of the parties’ communication).  Of particular relevance are the following three 
interactions:  
First, after Incident One, EQT sent a notice of default letter to Orion referencing 
section 6.5(1)(F) of the Rig 18 drilling contract, as well as the applicable cure period, and 
stressing that Orion needed to cure the problem “to EQT’s satisfaction,” JA3343.  
Second, after Incident Two, EQT sent Orion a letter noting in part that due to 
Orion’s failure to timely cure the block malfunction pursuant to the first notice of 
default—as evidenced by the occurrence of Incident Two—Orion was in default of the 
Rig 18 Drilling Contract per section 6.5 of the drilling contract.6  
Third, after Incident Three, EQT sent Orion written notice that Rig 18 was to be 
shut down for “environmental, health and safety protection and due to material unsafe 
conditions,” JA3396, after a “third party contractor on the drilling floor when the Rig 
 
such systems “control the operation—indeed, every function—of drilling rigs, including 
ensuring that the rigs’ blocks travel at a safe speed”).   
 
6 After Incident Two, it was determined that an IDS “programming error had been 
entered into the control system” and that this error was “likely the cause” of both Incident 
One and Incident Two.  Orion Drilling, 2019 WL 4273861, at *6.  
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failed was nearly killed when the blocks landed inches away,” id., and noting that Orion 
was in default per subsections 6.5(1)(F) and 6.5(1)(H) of the Rig 18 drilling contract.7   
The parties engaged in extensive communication regarding rig issues after each 
incident in an attempt to resolve these problems.  See, e.g., Orion Drilling, 2019 WL 
4273861, at *6–9 (recounting in greater detail the parties’ interactions).  Relevant to this 
appeal, and in addition to EQT’s three letters just discussed, is a letter agreement the 
parties’ reached on June 16, 2016 (herein the “Letter Agreement”), after Incident Three 
occurred and EQT sent a shutdown letter.   
In the Letter Agreement, the parties agreed to various conditions which 
“document[ed] the steps to be taken by Orion to address EQT’s stated concerns for the 
safety of its employees and contractors.”  Id. at *8.8  One of the conditions was that an 
independent safety engineering firm, Aberdeen Drilling Consultants, Ltd. (“ADC”), 
would conduct an investigation.  After ADC investigated Rig 18 and “identified 11 
 
7 In this letter, EQT also “request[ed] that Orion perform a formal investigation 
and root cause analysis of this latest block dropping failure,” noting that the “shut down 
and suspension of Rig [18] operations [would] continue until Orion” met certain 
conditions.  JA3396.  
 
8 Additional agreements included the extension of the cure period specified in 
subsections 6.5(1)(F) and 6.5(1)(H) of the Rig 18 drilling contract to “July 9, 2016, or 
seven days after the written assessment described” later in the Letter Agreement was 
delivered, and the completion, by Orion, of any “additional repairs or preventative 
measures” that Aberdeen Drilling Consultants, Ltd. (“ADC”) deems necessary for the 
“safe operation of” Rig 18, subject to the “satisfaction of EQT and ADC prior to the 
expiration of the extended cure period[.]”  JA3402.  The Letter Agreement also stated 
that: “Except as set forth herein, all terms and conditions of the Contract and any prior 
Amendments remain in force and in effect between the parties.”  JA3403.  Orion refers to 
this Letter Agreement as the “Fourth Amendment to the Rig 18 Drilling Contract.”  
Appellant Br. 9.   
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nonconformance issues and made several key conclusions that raised serious concerns 
with the safety of the hardware and software of the IDS control system,” id. at *9, EQT 
proceeded to send four additional crucial letters to Orion.  See id. (noting that ADC’s 
report indicated that “even if [Orion did] everything” that ADC prescribed, there was still 
uncertainty regarding whether “the rig could operate safely” (alteration in the original) 
(citation and quotation marks omitted)).   
First, EQT sent a letter to Orion shutting down Rig 17—as that rig relied on the 
same IDS control system as Rig 18.  Next, EQT sent Orion a notice of default and breach 
letter for Rig 17 pursuant to both section 6.5 and Exhibit A, section 7.3 of the Rig 17 
drilling contract.  See also id. at *10 (detailing how this “notice identified 16 serious 
safety incidents on Rig 17, including erratic brake operation and at least one instance 
where the brakes did not engage, resulting in a dropped block.”).  Then, EQT sent Orion 
a termination letter for Rig 18.9  And finally, EQT sent Orion a termination letter for Rig 
17.10   
B. Procedural Background 
Orion brought a two-count breach of contract complaint against EQT for the early 
termination of the Drilling Contracts in an attempt to recover liquidated damages 
payments.  Orion asserted that EQT could not “terminate the contract before the end of 
 
9 This letter was sent on July 27, 2016.   
 
10 This letter was sent on September 12, 2016.   
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the contract term unless it [paid] the early termination payment as calculated under 
[Exhibit A, section 7.3.]”  JA320, 321.11  
Prior to trial, the District Court ruled that section 6.5 and Exhibit A, section 7.3 of 
the Drilling Contracts were unambiguous, alternative methods for terminating the 
Drilling Contracts.12  See, e.g., JA27 (explaining that the identical provisions in both 
Drilling Contracts “unambiguously allow EQT to terminate pursuant either to 6.5 or 7.3 
of Exhibit A without the payment of any liquidated damages, and this is the plain 
meaning as set forth on that issue.”).  The District Court also ruled that Orion spoliated 
evidence, and accordingly gave an adverse inference spoliation instruction to the jury 
during trial. 
At the conclusion of the trial, a jury returned a verdict in favor of EQT.  The jury 
found that EQT did not breach the Rig 18 drilling contract, did breach the Rig 17 drilling 
contract by terminating “early and failing to pay the early termination fee,” JA1322, but 
that Orion had materially breached the Rig 17 drilling contract, that the material breach 
was subject to cure, and that Orion failed to timely cure.   
On February 1, 2019, the District Court entered final judgment on the jury verdict.  
On February 28, 2019, Orion filed a motion for a new trial pursuant to Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 59, as well as a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law pursuant 
 
11 Exhibit A, section 7.3 provides details on how liquidated damages would be 
calculated if early termination occurred per that provision.  See, e.g., Orion Drilling, 
2019 WL 4273861, at *4 (reproducing Exhibit A, section 7.3).  
 
12 We note here that the parties consented to trial before a magistrate judge.  See 
CM/ECF No. 126; see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(c); Fed. R. Civ. P. 73. 
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to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b).  On September 10, 2019, the District Court 
entered an Opinion and Order denying Orion’s February 28, 2019 motions, as well as an 
Opinion and Order granting EQT’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs, pursuant to 
section 7.15 of the Drilling Contracts.  On October 7, 2019, Orion filed a timely Notice of 
Appeal, appealing the two September 10, 2019 orders.   
II.     JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
  The District Court had diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332.  We 
have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  
We review a district court’s construction of a contract, for example, its finding that 
a contract is unambiguous, de novo.  See Nat’l Football League Players’ Concussion 
Injury Litig., 923 F.3d 96, 107 n.8 (3d Cir. 2019) (“[C]ontract construction, that is, the 
legal operation of the contract, is a question of law mandating plenary review” (citation 
omitted)); see also Wayne Land & Mineral Grp. LLC v. Del. River Basin Comm’n, 894 
F.3d 509, 528 (3d Cir. 2018) (“Under our case law, contract interpretation is a question of 
fact reviewed for clear error and contract construction is a question of law reviewed de 
novo. . . . [W]e review de novo the text of the [contract] to determine whether we agree 
with the District Court that it is unambiguous.”).    
We review the “legal standard enunciated in a jury instruction” de novo, and its 
“expression” for an abuse of discretion.  United States v. Lee, 359 F.3d 194, 203 (3d Cir. 
2004) (citation omitted).  We will consider whether, as a whole, the instruction “apprized 
the jury of the issues and the applicable law.”  Id. (citation omitted).  Further, harmless 
instructional errors that do not prejudice a party are insufficient for a judgment to be 
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vacated and for a new trial to be ordered.  Armstrong v. Burdette Tomlin Mem’l Hosp., 
438 F.3d 240, 245–46 (3d Cir. 2006).  An error is harmless “if it is highly probable that 
the error did not affect the outcome of the case. . . . High probability requires that the 
court have a sure conviction that the error did not prejudice the defendant, but need not 
disprove every reasonable possibility of prejudice.”  GN Netcom, Inc. v. Plantronics, Inc., 
930 F.3d 76, 88 (3d Cir. 2019) (citations and quotation marks omitted).   
 We review an order granting or denying a motion for judgment as a matter of law 
de novo, “apply[ing] the same standard as the district court.”  In re Lemington for the 
Aged, 777 F.3d 620, 626 (3d Cir. 2015) (citation omitted).  Our review of a district 
court’s denial of a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law is highly deferential, 
reviewing the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and granting 
the motion only if “the record is critically deficient of that minimum quantity of evidence 
from which a jury might reasonably afford relief.”  See id. (citation omitted).  Reversal, 
in instances where the party with the burden of proof files a renewed motion for 
judgment as a matter of law, “is reserved for . . . extreme circumstances[.]”  Gay v. 
Petsock, 917 F.2d 768, 771 (3d Cir. 1990).   
 Finally, evidentiary rulings are reviewed for an abuse of discretion, unless the 
district court’s evidentiary rulings are based on a legal interpretation of the Federal Rules 
of Evidence, in which case our review is de novo.  United States v. Green, 617 F.3d 233, 
239 (3d Cir. 2010).  “Sanctions for spoliation of evidence are [also] reviewed for an 
abuse of discretion.”  Bull v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 665 F.3d 68, 73 (3d Cir. 2012).  
“An abuse of discretion occurs only where the district court’s decision is arbitrary, 
11 
 
fanciful, or clearly unreasonable—in short, where no reasonable person would adopt the 
district court’s view.”  Green, 617 F.3d at 239 (citation and quotation marks omitted).  If 
there were errors regarding the “admission or exclusion of evidence” reversal or a new 
trial is only warranted if the errors were harmful,  Abrams v. Lightolier Inc., 50 F.3d 
1204, 1213 (3d Cir. 1995), and “[a]n erroneous evidentiary ruling will be considered 
harmless if it is highly probable that the district court’s ruling did not affect the party’s 
substantial rights,” Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Norwin Sch. Dist., 544 F.3d 229, 251 (3d Cir. 
2008) (citation, quotation marks, and alterations omitted).   
III.     ANALYSIS 
  There are six issues on appeal.  The first three issues arise from the District 
Court’s rulings and subsequent jury instructions pertaining to: (1) the Drilling Contracts’ 
operative provisions, (2) material breach, and (3) proof of performance.  The fourth issue 
concerns (4) the denial of Orion’s renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law.  The 
final two issues address evidentiary rulings and jury instructions concerning (5) the 
preclusion of certain evidence and (6) spoliation.  For the reasons provided below, we 
find no error in any of the District Court’s rulings.                                               
A. The Three Contract Rulings and Subsequent Jury Instructions   
1. Section 6.5 and Exhibit A, section 7.3 of the Drilling 
Contracts are unambiguous and provide two alternative 
methods for termination.   
 
The District Court correctly found, and thus instructed the jury, that section 6.5 
and Exhibit A, section 7.3 of the Drilling Contracts are each unambiguous.  Each sets 
forth separate and harmonious conditions under which the Drilling Contracts could be 
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terminated without payment of liquidated damages.  As such, Orion’s contention that 
Exhibit A, subsections 7.3(a)–(c) set forth the only permissible way for EQT to terminate 
the Drilling Contracts early without having to pay liquidated damages is incorrect.13  
 
13 During oral argument, Orion implied that the Rig 18 Letter Agreement’s force 
and effect is at issue here, suggesting that EQT had failed to abide by its specific cure 
period.  See Oral Argument at 04:35–06:10, 11:11–12:35, 13:15–15:57 (July 2, 2020), 
https://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/oralargument/audio/19-
3307_OrionDrillingCov.EQTProductionCo.mp3; see also id. at 16:32–19:20 (arguing 
that there is ample evidence supporting the failure of Orion to cure within the Letter 
Agreement’s cure period).   
Orion’s appellate briefing makes only “passing reference[s]” to the Letter 
Agreement, and “[w]e have held on numerous occasions that an issue is waived unless a 
party raises it in its opening brief, and for those purposes a passing reference to an 
issue will not suffice to bring that issue before this court.”  Skretvedt v. E.I. DuPont De 
Nemours, 372 F.3d 193, 202–03 (3d Cir. 2004) (citation, quotation marks, and alteration 
omitted).  Rather, Orion’s appellate briefing is centered on the controlling nature of 
Exhibit A, section 7.3, how that provision is the sole means by which EQT could 
terminate the contract early, and how section 6.5 does not permit the avoidance of 
liquidated damages payments.  See, e.g., Appellant Br. 22.  Orion thus forfeited the 
argument that the operative provision, and the provision breached by EQT, was the Letter 
Agreement.  See also Robinson v. First State Cmty. Action Agency, 920 F.3d 182, 187 (3d 
Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 464 (2019) (explaining the difference between 
forfeiture and waiver).   
Factually though, entertaining Orion’s oral argument suggestion that EQT failed to 
abide by the Letter Agreement’s cure period—an argument separate and apart from the 
controlling nature of either Exhibit A, section 7.3 or section 6.5—per the Letter 
Agreement, the cure period was extended to either “5:00pm on July 9, 2016 or seven 
days after the written assessment described in paragraph 2 is delivered to Orion, 
whichever date is later.”  JA3402.  ADC’s report was sent to Orion on July 8, 2016.  
Thus, per the Letter Agreement, the cure period would have extended until seven days 
after July 8, 2016.  EQT terminated the Rig 18 drilling contract on July 27, 2016.  The 
termination letter was thus sent after expiration of the Letter Agreement’s cure period, 
and as the District Court noted in its discussion of its jury instruction pertaining to the 
Letter Agreement—an instruction that is also not one of the issues on appeal—“there was 
sufficient evidence regarding EQT’s dissatisfaction with Orion’s attempts to cure ADC-
identified defects[.]”  Orion Drilling, 2019 WL 4273861, at *24.  As the Letter 
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Pennsylvania contract law is clear, “unambiguous [contracts] are construed by 
[courts] as a matter of law.”  Trizechahn Gateway LLC v. Titus, 976 A.2d 474, 483 (Pa. 
2009).   “A contract is ambiguous if it is reasonably susceptible of different constructions 
and capable of being understood in more than one sense.”  Id. at 483 (citation omitted) 
(emphasis added).  Whereas, “[w]hen the words of a contract are clear and unambiguous, 
the intent of the parties must be ascertained from the language employed in the contract, 
which shall be given its commonly accepted and plain meaning.”  TruServ Corp. v. 
Morgan’s Tool & Supply Co., 39 A.3d 253, 260 (Pa. 2012) (emphasis added); see also 
Murphy v. Duquesne Univ. of the Holy Ghost, 777 A.2d 418, 429 (Pa. 2001) 
(emphasizing that the entire contract must be considered to ascertain the parties’ intent, 
and that extrinsic evidence may only be considered to determine intent when there is an 
ambiguity); id. (“Courts do not assume that . . . the parties were ignorant of the meaning 
of the language they employed.”).  Further, specific provisions, as opposed to general 
provisions, “are more likely to reflect the intent of the parties,”  Trinity Indus., Inc. v. 
Greenlease Holding Co., 903 F.3d 333, 350 (3d Cir. 2018) (citation omitted), and 
“[a]bsent fraud or unconscionability, courts should not set aside terms on which 
 
Agreement made clear, any “repairs or preventative measures” that ADC identified, had 
to be completed “to the satisfaction of EQT and ADC[.]”  JA3402. 
Additionally, though separate, in its appellate briefing, Orion also asserted that 
EQT’s conduct demonstrated that it never believed that it could terminate the Drilling 
Contracts early without liability for liquidated damages payments.  Not only was this 
argument waived by Orion, Robinson, 920 F.3d at 187, but also the District Court noted 
the sufficient “evidence at trial permit[ing] the jury to find that the parties, both 
sophisticated entities, operated with the understanding that the default provision set forth 
at Section 6.5 remained in effect,” Orion Drilling, 2019 WL 4273861, at *14.    
14 
 
sophisticated parties agreed,” John B. Conomos, Inc. v. Sun Co. (R&M), 831 A.2d 696, 
708 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003).  
Here, it is clear that section 6.5 and Exhibit A, section 7.3 are unambiguous, 
reasonably serving two separate purposes.  TruServ, 39 A.3d at 260.  On the one hand, 
section 6.5 permits EQT to terminate a drilling contract when Orion is in default, and it 
includes no mention of liquidated damages.  See Orion Drilling, 2019 WL 4273861 at 
*3–4 (reproducing the contract language).  On the other hand, Exhibit A, section 7.3, 
permits EQT to terminate the Drilling Contracts at any time, so long as liquidated 
damages are paid, or, if one of three conditions are met, without payment.  Id. at *4–5.   
Based on the language of the Drilling Contracts and the entire agreement taken as 
whole, it is evident that these sophisticated parties intended for section 6.5 and Exhibit A, 
section 7.3 to be independent provisions that work together harmoniously.  See 
Engelhard Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 437 F.3d 374, 381 (3d Cir. 2006) (reiterating “the well 
established principles of contract construction—to read, if possible, all provisions of a 
contract together as a harmonious whole”); Vasilis v. Bell of Pa., 598 A.2d 52, 54 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1991) (explaining that sophisticated parties can be experienced businesses that 
have equal bargaining power when entering into a contract).14   
 
14 Further supporting this reading is that the parties struck from the Drilling 
Contracts sections 6.3 and 6.4—sections that had pertained to early termination—added 
Exhibit A, section 7.3, and kept section 6.5, indicating the parties were not ignorant of the 
existence of these provisions or their intended meaning.  See Orion Drilling, 2019 WL 
4273861, at *2–5 (reproducing the contract language); Murphy, 777 A.2d at 429; 
Conomos, 831 A.2d at 708; see also LJL Transp., Inc. v. Pilot Air Freight Corp., 962 
A.2d 639, 648 (Pa. 2009) (“[W]e will not interpret one provision of a contract in a 
manner which results in another portion being annulled.”). 
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The District Court’s legal conclusion and subsequent jury instruction—i.e., that 
the Drilling Contracts contained two alternative contractual provisions by which EQT 
could terminate, and that early termination per section 6.5 did not require liquidated 
damages payments—was thus correct and not a misstatement of law or an abuse of 
discretion.  See Nat’l Football League, 923 F.3d at 107 n.8; Lee, 359 F.3d at 203.   
2. The material breach jury instruction was legally correct 
and not an abuse of discretion.  
 
The District Court’s ruling, the jury instruction, and the special verdict form 
regarding material breach were legally correct, and there was neither an abuse of 
discretion nor a harmful error.  Under Pennsylvania law, “when there is a breach of 
contract going directly to the essence of the contract, which is so exceedingly grave as to 
irreparably damage the trust between the contracting parties, the non-breaching party may 
terminate the contract without notice, absent explicit contractual provisions to the 
contrary.”  LJL, 962 A.2d at 652.  Indeed, in LJL, the court found that while paragraph 
23(c) of an agreement was a notice and cure provision, it was “not the exclusive means by 
which the agreement could be terminated,” as paragraph 30 was “an express reservation . 
. . of the right to exercise all remedies available . . . after a breach,” which inherently 
included the “power to terminate the contract without notice in the event of a vital and 
essential breach.”  Id. (emphasis added).  
Here, the Drilling Contracts do not contain an “explicit” or “exclusive” provision, 
which would preclude EQT from seeking redress from other remedies available at law.  
Id.  This is so because, as the District Court determined prior to trial, subsection 6.5(2)(C) 
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of the Drilling Contracts “preserve[d] the ordinary remedy of termination without notice 
or cure, where there is a breach of contract going directly to the essence of the contract, 
which is so exceedingly g[r]ave as to irreparably damage the trust between the 
contracting parties.”  JA30 (citation and quotation marks omitted); see also Orion 
Drilling, 2019 WL 4273861, at *3–4 (reproducing subsection 6.5(2)(C): “In the event of 
a default by [Orion] . . . [EQT] shall have the right . . . [t]o pursue any other remedy 
provided under this Contract or available at law or equity.”).   
The language of subsection 6.5(2)(C) is plain, preserving “any other remedy” that 
is “available at law or equity,” Orion Drilling, 2019 WL 4273861, at *4, which includes 
the remedy of termination without notice or cure, so long as there is a material breach 
going to the essence of the contract, as is articulated in LJL, see 962 A.2d at 651–52.  
Therefore, the District Court was correct in determining that per LJL, if there were a 
material breach, EQT would have been relieved of its notice and cure obligation due to 
the existence of subsection 6.5(2)(C) and the non-exclusive nature of the notice and cure 
provisions.  Thus, the District Court’s jury instruction was itself legally correct, and not 
an abuse of discretion.  Lee, 359 F.3d at 203.  Likewise, the special verdict form asking 
the jury to determine if Orion materially breached either the Rig 17 drilling contract or 
the Rig 18 drilling contract, and whether, if a material breach occurred, a cure period was 
required, was also legally correct.  See id.15 
 
15 Further, in the alternative, if there were an error here, it was harmless.  See 
Murray v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 145 F.3d 143, 156–57 (3d Cir. 1998); see also 
Armstrong, 438 F.3d at 245–46.  First, the jury did not decide whether the Rig 18 drilling 
contract was materially breached by Orion because it determined that EQT did not breach 
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3. The proof of performance jury instruction was correct 
and not an abuse of discretion.  
 
The District Court’s proof of performance jury instruction was legally correct and 
not an abuse of discretion.  Under Pennsylvania law, a plaintiff suing for breach of 
contract must establish that there was a contract, a breach, and damages.  See McShea v. 
City of Phila., 995 A.2d 334, 340 (Pa. 2010).  Further, though, “[w]hen a party to a 
contract seeks to enforce the agreement or to recover damages for breach of the 
agreement, that party must prove that he has performed all of his own obligations under 
 
that contract by terminating early.  Second, though the jury did find that Orion was in 
material breach of the Rig 17 drilling contract, it likewise found that the Rig 17 drilling 
contract was subject to a cure period, but that Orion failed to timely cure.  See Murray, 
145 F.3d at 156–57; see also, e.g. Orion Drilling, 2019 WL 4273861, at *19 (noting that 
despite Orion’s characterization of its actions as merely “poor performance” the jury was 
entitled to determine, and in fact did determine, that Orion’s conduct and failure to cure, 
despite repeated representations that it had cured, the IDS control system, amounted to 
more than mere poor performance).  Thus, the jury’s own finding vitiated any concern 
that the potentially erroneous material breach instruction had absolved EQT of providing 
a necessary cure period, as the jury found said cure period had been provided.   
Additionally, Orion’s contention that only fraudulent conduct supports a finding of 
material breach is unsupported by case law.  For example, Orion references Milton 
Regional Sewer Authority v. Travelers Casualty & Surety. Co. of America for support, 
however, that non-precedential case only notes that a “typical example” of material 
breach is “fraud,” thus in no way conclusively holding fraud is necessary.  648 F. App’x 
215, 217 (3d Cir. 2016).  
Orion’s additional claims that EQT failed to preserve a material breach argument 
by not immediately terminating the Drillings Contracts and by failing to argue material 
breach as an affirmative defense are also incorrect.  First, the law does not require 
immediate termination, especially where a party’s conduct does not amount to acceptance 
of a breach. Gillard v. Martin, 13 A.3d 482, 488–89 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2010).  EQT’s notice 
of default letters cannot be construed as acceptance of default, but rather as warnings to 
Orion.  Further, EQT arguably pled and raised material breach throughout trial.  See 
Charpentier v. Godsil, 937 F.2d 859, 864 (3d Cir. 1991); see also Orion Drilling, 2019 
WL 4273861, at *18.  Thus, EQT did not waive a material breach argument.  
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the contract.”  Trumbull Corp. v. Boss Constr., Inc., 801 A.2d 1289, 1292 (Pa. Commw. 
Ct. 2002) (quoting Nikole, Inc. v. Kliner, 603 A.2d 587, 593 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992)); see 
also Cimina v. Bronich, 537 A.2d 1355, 1358 (Pa. 1988) (holding that “only material 
failure of performance by one party discharges the other party . . . an immaterial failure 
does not operate as such a discharge” (omission in original) (emphasis added) (citation 
omitted)).    
Here, the Drilling Contracts imposed obligations on Orion, as well as EQT.  See, 
e.g., Orion Drilling, 2019 WL 4273861, at *3 (reproducing subsections 6.5(1)(F) and 
6.5(1)(H) of the Drilling Contracts, which respectively find Orion in default if it “[f]ail[s] 
to comply with requirement[s] or material provision[s] of [the Drilling Contracts] in 
accordance with industry standards” and “[c]ontinuously violate[s] [EQT’s] safety, 
environmental, controlled substances or other applicable rules and policies in any 
material respect”).  Thus, Orion not only had to establish the elements of its breach of 
contract claim but also proof of its own performance, to show that it was not in default.  
See McShea, 995 A.2d at 340; Trumbull Corp., 801 A.2d at 1292.   
The District Court’s jury instruction was thus both legally correct and not an abuse 
of discretion.  Lee, 359 F.3d at 203.  Additionally, even if, in the alternative, the jury 
instruction were erroneous, Orion experienced no substantial prejudice.  See, e.g., Orion 
Drilling, 2019 WL 4273861, at *20 (explaining the overwhelming evidence supporting 
the jury’s verdict, and “Orion’s repeated failure to cure the defective IDS control system 
and its false representations that the control system was safe for continued drilling 
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operations”); see also GN Netcom, 930 F.3d at 88 (“We will not reverse if the District 
Court’s error was harmless . . . .”).  
B. The District Court Did Not Err in Denying Orion’s Renewed Motion 
for Judgment as a Matter of Law   
 
The District Court’s denial of Orion’s renewed motion for judgment as a matter of 
law was proper.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b); see also Lightning Lube, Inc. v. Witco Corp., 
4 F.3d 1153, 1166 (3d Cir. 1993) (explaining that a Rule 50(b) motion should only be 
granted when “viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant . . . 
there is insufficient evidence”).  Here, there was ample evidence upon which the jury 
could have properly based its verdict.  Id.; see also In re Lemington, 777 F.3d at 626.  
In addressing the renewed motion, the District Court thoroughly recounted the 
evidence presented at trial supporting the jury’s findings regarding both Rig 17 and Rig 
18.  See Orion Drilling, 2019 WL 4273861, at *13–17.  Specifically, regarding Rig 18, 
the jury heard sufficient evidence that Orion was in default per section 6.5 of the Rig 18 
drilling contract, failing to comply with industry standards and cure.  See id. at *15 
(recounting evidence adduced at trial).16  Regarding Rig 17, the jury also heard sufficient 
evidence that Orion materially breached the Rig 17 drilling contract and failed to cure the 
IDS control system responsible for the overarching safety problems on both rigs within 
the allotted time period after notice from EQT, such that EQT was relieved of its 
 
16 Orion’s belief that it complied with the terms of the Letter Agreement ignores 
that that “there was sufficient evidence regarding EQT’s dissatisfaction with Orion’s 
attempts to cure” pursuant to the Letter Agreement.  Orion Drilling, 2019 WL 4273861, 
at *24.  
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contractual obligations to Orion.17  Id. at *15–16; see also Widmer Eng’g, Inc. v. Dufalla, 
837 A.2d 459, 467 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003) (“[M]aterial breach by one party to a contract 
entitles the non-breaching party to suspend performance”); see also LJL, 962 A.2d at 652 
(excusing one party’s compliance with notice and cure provisions in a contract if said 
provisions are not exclusive, and so long as the other party has materially breached the 
contract).  As such, the record in this case is not “critically deficient of that minimum 
quantum of evidence from which a jury might reasonably afford relief.”  Simmons v. City 
of Phila., 947 F.2d 1042, 1067 (3d Cir. 1991) (citation omitted).  The District Court 
correctly denied Orion’s renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law.  Orion 
Drilling, 2019 WL 4273861, at *17; Lemington, 777 F.3d at 626.   
C. The District Court’s Evidentiary Rulings  
The District Court did not abuse its discretion in either of its evidentiary rulings—
i.e., (1) its preclusion of certain evidence, and (2) its spoliation determination and adverse 
inference instruction.  
1. Evidence Preclusion  
The District Court’s preclusion of two irrelevant categories of evidence does not 
constitute an abuse of discretion.  Evidence must be relevant to be admitted at trial.  See 
Fed. R. Evid. 401, 402; see also Fed. R. Evid. 403 (excluding “relevant evidence if its 
 
17 Orion’s contention that its poor performance did not amount to material breach 
misstates the evidence from trial, which showed more than mere poor performance, but 
its inability to “consistently . . . meet an agreed-upon level of care, and [its] repeated[] 
fail[ure] to cure identified deficiencies.”  Orion Drilling, 2019 WL 4273861, at *16; see 
also id. (detailing the evidence the jury heard about Rig 17’s failures and similarities to 
Rig 18).  
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probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: 
unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or 
needlessly presenting cumulative evidence”).   
Here, the two categories of evidence Orion sought to introduce were not relevant.  
One category pertained to EQT’s purported financial motivations for terminating the 
Drilling Contracts (i.e., Orion believed EQT’s financial motives showed a lack of good 
faith), and the other category pertained to the amount of money Orion spent building the 
rigs.  Neither category of evidence supported Orion’s breach of contract claims.  See, e.g., 
Biborosch v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 603 A.2d 1050, 1058 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) 
(explaining that a party’s “[i]ll will or malice is not an element of a cause of action for 
breach of contract and . . .  is extraneous to recovery for breach of contract”); see also 
John B. Conomos, Inc., 381 A.2d at 707 n.6 (noting that a party’s motive “is not 
controlling in causes of action under contract law”); Carlos R. Leffler, Inc. v. Hutter, 696 
A.2d 157, 162 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997) (explaining that where there are proper liquidated 
damages provisions in a contract a party “cannot later claim entitlement to actual 
damages”).  
Though Orion claims the economic motivation evidence was relevant to show 
EQT’s bad faith motive in terminating the Drilling Contracts, the economic motivation 
evidence was not only, as the District Court described it, “scant,” but also had “no 
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apparent relevance whatsoever.”  JA2314.18  As such, it was not unreasonable for the 
District Court to determine that “the proffered [economic motivation] evidence . . . does 
not tend to prove or disprove the existence or the terms o[f] a breach of the contract that 
is at issue, nor does it bear on the question of whether the safety violations existed such 
that EQT had the right to find that Orion was in material breach.” JA2314.  Similarly, 
Orion’s evidence regarding its own investment in building the rigs did not make its 
breach of contract claims “more or less probable.”  Fed. R. Evid. 401.   
As the District Court noted, this case was not concerned with the Rig 17 and Rig 
18 construction contracts, and reference to Orion’s investments in the rigs was “not 
appropriate nor warranted,” as it was irrelevant to the breach of contract claims.  JA2361; 
see also Orion Drilling, 2019 WL 4273861, at *26.19  The District Court’s determination 
that these two categories of evidence were not relevant to Orion’s breach of contract 
claims was not unreasonable and does not constitute an abuse of discretion.  See Green, 
617 F.3d, at 239.20   
 
 
 
18 For example, deposition testimony from Orion’s CEO illustrates the lack of 
concrete evidence Orion had regarding EQT’s alleged economic motivation for 
termination.   
 
19 Orion’s argument that EQT “consistently argue[d],” Appellant Br. 47, that 
Orion would suffer no financial hardship is also belied by the record.  See, e.g., JA2198.  
 
20 To the extent the District Court’s evidentiary rulings relied on its interpretation 
of the Federal Rules of Evidence, there was no legal error in said interpretation.  See 
Green, 617 F.3d at 239. 
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2. Spoliation 
The District Court’s spoliation finding and adverse inference instruction do not 
constitute an abuse of discretion.  Bull, 665 F.3d at 73.  Spoliation of evidence occurs 
where: (1) “the evidence was in the party’s control,” (2) “the evidence is relevant to the 
claims or defenses in the case,” (3) “there has been actual suppression or withholding of 
evidence,” and (4) “the duty to preserve the evidence was reasonably foreseeable to the 
party.”  Id.  “No unfavorable inference arises when the circumstances indicate that the 
document or article in question has been lost or accidentally destroyed, or where the 
failure to produce it is otherwise properly accounted for.”  Id. at 79 (citation omitted).  
“[A] finding of bad faith is pivotal to a spoliation determination.”  Id.  
Here, the spoliated evidence pertained to the handwritten notes of one Orion 
employee, Jamie Garza, and the handwritten notes and copies of marked-up contracts of 
another Orion employee, Owen Brandt.  Both employees were operations managers and 
superintendents who oversaw the operation of both rigs.  Garza, prior to changing 
positions and office locations a few days before the present lawsuit was filed, threw away 
certain notes, which he categorized as “junk.”  JA5.  Brandt, Garza’s supervisor, prior to 
leaving Orion’s Pennsylvania office, also interestingly took certain “stuff” with him and 
left the “rest” behind.  JA9.  Orion was unable to produce the handwritten notes of both 
employees, and the copies of marked-up contracts that EQT surmised Brandt likely 
possessed. 
There is no doubt that the evidence in question was in Orion’s control.  Bull, 665 
F.3d at 73.  The relevance of the documents—documents pertaining to the two rigs, some 
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marked-up with notes by Orion employees tasked with overseeing said rigs—is likewise 
clear.  Id.  Further, Garza’s own deposition testimony—that he threw some documents 
away the day before Orion filed suit—supports the conclusion that there was an 
intentional destruction of certain documents that were foreseeably relevant to Orion’s 
forthcoming lawsuit against EQT.  Id.; see also JA8 (“Garza had knowledge that a 
dispute had arisen between the parties, that a lawsuit was about to be filed and he 
destroyed certain documents relative to operations of the two rigs at issue.  This 
intentional action is sufficient to satisfy the element of bad faith.”).  And though Brandt’s 
intentional throwing away of documents is less clear, it is clear that he took certain 
documents with him, leaving the rest behind with Orion, and that Orion was unable to 
produce hardcopies of the documents requested by EQT, related to the rigs in question, 
and relevant to the lawsuit brought by Orion.   
Further, as the District Court found, at the time Brandt left in 2015, “it was 
reasonably foreseeable [due to operational incidents on Rig 17 and Rig 18, which had 
already occurred] that Orion had a duty to preserve the documents of this key employee.”  
JA11.  Thus, the District Court’s finding that Orion’s failure to produce these documents 
included both intentional destruction and bad faith failure to preserve, was not 
unreasonable.  See Orion Drilling, 2019 WL 4273861, at *32 (“Under the circumstances 
presented, and giving consideration to the subject matter of the notes and timing of 
anticipated and threatened litigation  . . . the [District] Court found that EQT met its 
burden of proving that Orion had acted in bad faith with regard to the willful spoliation or 
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failure to preserve evidence in the possession of two key employees.”); see also Bull, 665 
F.3d at 73.21   
Similarly, the District Court reached a reasonable conclusion regarding “Orion’s 
relative fault in failing to preserve evidence regarding Rigs 17 and 18 in the possession of 
its most senior operations personnel[.]”  Orion Drilling, 2019 WL 4273861, at *33.  It 
noted the questionable “timing of when the documents were ‘lost,’” id., and explained the 
“[f]actors favoring the adverse inference instruction,”—i.e., the “lost” evidence that 
“would have buttressed EQT’s contention that the control system defects were known 
and remained uncured through the date of termination, as well as the likelihood that 
Orion understood the continued viability of Section 6.5 of the contract,” id.—that 
supported its finding.  The District Court’s permissive22 and tailored adverse inference 
instruction was reasonable and not an abuse of discretion.  See Schmid v. Milwaukee 
Elec. Tool Corp., 13 F.3d 76, 79 (3d Cir. 1994) (providing the three factors to consider 
 
21 Orion’s assertion that the District Court precluded it from presenting rebuttable 
evidence is an inaccurate recount of the trial, as Orion was permitted to play, and indeed 
played, the deposition testimony of both Garza and Brandt.  See also Orion Drilling, 
2019 WL 4273861, at *32 (“[T]he Court permitted Orion to present testimony regarding 
the circumstances of how the documents were purportedly ‘thrown away’ to rebut the 
inference that the destruction was intentional”).  In its appellate briefing, Orion never 
explicitly described what evidence it sought to introduce to rebut the spoliation findings, 
but alludes to presenting an affidavit from Garza containing points regarding his 
deposition testimony.  
  
22 There is no question that the adverse inference instruction was permissive as 
opposed to mandatory, giving the jury the option to decide whether the “evidence not 
preserved or destroyed . . . was relevant,” as well as the option to decide if that evidence 
“would have been unfavorable to Orion and favorable to EQT,” and whether such a 
finding was even “important . . . in reaching [the] verdict.” See JA1597–1598; see also 
JA1602.  
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when determining the appropriateness of a spoliation sanction); see also GN Netcom, 930 
F.3d at 83 (noting that a “permissive adverse inference instruction” is a “lesser 
sanction”).   
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the District Court’s September 10, 
2019 Orders.  
